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OPERATIONAL DECEPTION: U.S. Joint Doctrine and the Persian Gulf War

A Monograph
By
Major Henry S. Larsen III
Field Artillery



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 94-95

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Major Henry S. Larsen III

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Approved by:

Richard M Swain Monograph Director
Richard M. Swain, Ph.D.

Gregory Fontenot Director, School of
COL Gregory Fontenot, MA, MMAS Advanced Military
Studies

Philip J. Brookes Director, Graduate
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Program

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ABSTRACT

OPERATIONAL DECEPTION: U.S. JOINT DOCTRINE AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR by Major Henry S. Larsen III, USA, 55 pages.

This monograph examines U.S. Joint doctrine for operational deception (Joint Pub 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military Deception). The monograph provides information to operational planners on deception concepts that are unique to Joint doctrine and how these concepts can be used when planning operational deception.

The monograph provides historical examples of operational deception by briefly examining deception operations in the Napoleonic Era, WWI, WWII, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The monograph compares unique Joint deception concepts with the deception operations performed by USCENTCOM in the Persian Gulf War. The monograph also compares Joint doctrine for operational deception with the earlier doctrines of the four U.S. Services.

The monograph concludes that USCENTCOM's operational deception in the Persian Gulf War is in concordance with subsequent Joint doctrine. Based on historical examples, the monograph makes recommendations for planners to consider when planning for and conducting operational deception. The monograph suggests changes to Services' doctrine for military deception.

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Introduction

"All warfare is based on deception." -- Sun Tzu¹

"To prepare a sham action with sufficient thoroughness to impress an enemy requires a considerable expenditure of time and effort, and the costs increase with the scale of the deception." -- Carl von Clausewitz²

Both military theorists are correct -- deception is an integral part of warfare and the act of deception requires valuable time, effort, and resources. In military operations, deception is a major contributor to achievement of surprise. Surprise, in turn, places the enemy off balance and allows the executor of a successful deception operation to seize the initiative. Viewed in this light, deception is a combat multiplier for the force that uses it successfully. Deception can be practiced at all three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic.³

This monograph examines US Joint doctrine for military deception at the operational level of war. Specifically, it asks: Would the deception operations performed by USCENTCOM during the Persian Gulf War be compatible with subsequent US Joint doctrine for military deception? The monograph, then, conducts a comparative analysis of Joint doctrine for military deception and the actual operational deception operations performed in the Persian Gulf War.

The monograph also examines the four Services' doctrine for military deception and performs comparative analysis between Joint and Service doctrines. Analysis shows that Joint doctrine, at times, sides with a particular

Service's doctrine; is in agreement with all the Services' doctrines; represents a compromise between two Services' doctrines; and expresses original thought on some issues.

The purpose of this monograph is to provide information to operational planners on deception concepts that are unique to Joint doctrine and to illustrate how these concepts can be applied when planning operational deception. Based on historical examples, the monograph makes recommendations for planners to consider when planning for and conducting military deception. The monograph also suggests changes to the Services' doctrine for military deception.

The US military has accelerated its creation of Joint doctrine during the last three years. Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, published on 6 June 1994, represents the US military's first significant attempt to codify deception doctrine at the Joint level. The US Air Force was the Lead Agent (LA) responsible for the development of Joint Pub 3-58.⁴ Joint doctrine for military deception was developed after various relevant Service doctrines.

The US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps all possess their own doctrine for military deception. The degree of depth and focus varies by Service based on service culture and doctrinal inclinations. The purpose of Joint doctrine is to enhance the combat effectiveness of US forces.⁵ Joint doctrine is authoritative but not directive.⁶ However, if conflicts exist between Joint doctrine and

Service doctrine, Joint doctrine will take precedence for the activities of Joint forces.⁷

Operational Deception -- Historical Background

Operational deception had its beginning with the birth of an operational level of war during the Napoleonic period. Operational warfare involved linking a series of battles fought by separate large formations into a decisive campaign to achieve strategic objectives within a theater of war. The commander could no longer see his entire force and depended on communications, intelligence, and subordinates' understanding of his intent to guide his distant forces.

During the Campaign of 1805, Napoleon used operational deception to achieve decisive victory over the Third Coalition. Napoleon's deception plan was simple. He reinforced the enemy's preconception that he would attack through the Black Forest by conducting a corps-sized feint using Murat's cavalry corps.⁸ With General Mack and the Austrian Army concentrating their efforts on resisting an attack from the west, Napoleon could conduct a deep flanking attack into the Austrian's main line of communication using seven corps of the Grand Armée.

The Austrians were fooled by the deception and committed their efforts toward the Black Forest. French operational security,⁹ and Mack's obsession with activities in the Black Forest, caused the Austrian Army to remain in an exposed position at Ulm while the trap closed behind them. With positional advantage secured, the Grand Armée fought and

won a series of battles culminating with the surrender of the Austrian Army at Ulm. Austrian losses at Ulm alone stood at 30,000 men, 2,000 cavalry, and 60 guns.¹⁰

During WWI, the British used operational deception effectively in Palestine. Late in 1917, the British offensive towards Jerusalem had stalled with the Turkish Army holding a line from Gaza to Beersheba. Two British attacks on Gaza had failed.¹¹ To break the stalemate, the British high command concocted a deception operation portraying the story of a third main attack on Gaza with a diversionary attack on Beersheba. The deception objective was to make the Turkish Army reinforce Gaza while defending Beersheba with an economy of force effort. The British also wanted the Turks to believe the attack would take place on 4 November, instead of the actual date of 31 October. The actual British plan called for a main attack through Beersheba, allowing for a deep penetration and the flanking of Turkish forces in and around Gaza.

To reinforce the deception, the intelligence officer who thought up the story allowed himself nearly to be captured by Turkish forces. While fleeing on horseback, LTC Meinertzhagen feigned being shot and dropped military items to include a bloody haversack that contained false operation orders for the main attack on Gaza.¹² The "Haversack Ruse" was reinforced by deceptive radio communications and British patrols seeking to recapture the haversack. The British deception worked. The Turkish Army moved two divisions from Beersheba into a general reserve behind Gaza. On 31 October,

the British attack on Beersheba surprised the Turkish Army and allowed the British to take Jerusalem on 9 December 1917.

Like the Danube Campaign of 1805, the Haversack Ruse helped the British Army to achieve operational surprise and positional advantage over the Turkish Army. Interestingly, the British would use the very same deception story of hiding the main attack during Operation Bertrum in the battle of El Alamein in October 1942.¹³

The British Army also showed the capacity to neglect operational deception during WWI. In preparation for the Somme campaign in 1916, the British extensively prepared the battlefield around the Somme under close observation of the German Army. So obvious were the preparations that the Germans initially felt that they were a ruse designed to take their attention away from the actual area of attack.¹⁴ As the British preparations continued in the Somme area, the Germans correctly became convinced that the Somme would be the location of the British offensive. The British Army initiated the Somme Offensive with six days of artillery preparation and attacked on 1 July. Twenty thousand British soldiers were killed on the first day.¹⁵

During WWII, operational deception was practiced extensively by both Axis and Allied forces. Germany used operational deception in Poland, France, Norway, North Africa, and the Soviet Union. The Soviet use of deception (*maskirovka*) against the Germans is legendary. Perhaps the greatest deception effort of all was the operational

deception performed by British and US forces in support of Operation Overlord.

Operation Overlord was the invasion of northern France by Allied forces during WWII. Long anticipated by Hitler and the German general staff, Operation Overlord would be an opposed landing. The goal for the Allied forces was to attack in the place where the German Army least expected and was least prepared. Operation Bodyguard was the deception operation designed to deceive the Germans on the time and place the amphibious invasion was to occur.

The target for Operation Bodyguard was Hitler. The basic objective was to draw the maximum amount of German forces away from the Normandy area. Hitler, by this time in the war, was making the majority of the strategic and operational military decisions for Germany and was, therefore, the person the deception operation had to fool. Allied forces had previously broken Germany's Ultra codes and were receiving intelligence on German actions. Intercepted Ultra messages provided the Allies information on German high command intentions to defend Pas de Calais. Later, Ultra messages provided valuable feedback on the effects of the deception effort.

Operation Bodyguard was composed of four sub-operations: Zeppelin, Vendetta, Ironside, and Fortitude. Operation Zeppelin portrayed the story of a possible Allied invasion into Greece and the Baltic countries in order to keep German forces positioned in that area.¹⁶ Operation Vendetta portrayed the story of an Allied invasion into

southern France in order to keep the German 19th Army positioned there.¹⁷ Operation Ironside portrayed the story of an allied invasion into the Bordeaux area to keep the German 1st Army in place.¹⁸ Both Zeppelin and Vendetta were successful in deceiving the Germans. There is evidence that the Germans were not convinced with Ironside.

The fourth deception effort, Operation Fortitude, was conducted in two parts -- Fortitude North and Fortitude South. Fortitude North was an elaborate story of a British invasion of Norway to deprive the Germans of that country's natural resources. The deception was designed to keep the 200,000 German forces in Norway in place. Hitler, convinced that the operation would actually take place, reinforced Norway with an additional two divisions.

Fortitude South portrayed the story that the Allied invasion would take place at Pas de Calais. Hitler and the German military were inclined to believe that the Pas de Calais was the best location for an Allied invasion.¹⁹ Pas de Calais is the closest place to land in France from England. This proximity would allow the Allied forces to use air support more effectively than at Normandy or Britainy. Pas de Calais was also the shortest distance from landing site to the German heartland which Hitler believed was the Allies ultimate objective. Finally, Pas de Calais was also closest to the locations where Germany had its V1, V2, and V3 sites from which they were attacking British civilians in London.

The Allied forces had a number of stories to reinforce the Germans' preconceptions. Patton's fictional First US Army Group (FUSAG) was created and positioned directly across the Straights of Dover, opposite Pas de Calais. The German Army believed Patton to be the most successful US general and were inclined to believe he would lead the invasion forces for the US.²⁰ Patton's FUSAG was a combination of actual and notional units. The actual units slowly drained off as the invasion neared.

Operation Fortitude South was successful. Prior to the invasion on June 6th, German forces and efforts were heavily weighted in preparing Pas de Calais for the invasion. The German 15th Army with a majority of the Panzer divisions was placed at Pas de Calais while the 7th Army with only two Panzer divisions was stationed in the Normandy area.²¹ The effects of the deception lasted remarkably long after the actual invasion of Normandy took place. The Germans continued to be convinced that Normandy was a supporting effort and Patton's FUSAG would soon be landing at Pas de Calais. German forces remained committed to an invasion at Pas de Calais as late as seven weeks after the Normandy invasion.²² Like the Danube Campaign and the Haversack Ruse, Operation Bodyguard's primary objective was to cause the enemy to position his operational forces to his own disadvantage.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War pitted the forces of Egypt and Syria against Israel. Egypt used operational and strategic deception to set up the Israeli military for what

was nearly a catastrophic defeat. The deception story portrayed by Egypt was one of repetition and incompetence. The deception objective was to keep the Israeli military from mobilizing while the Egyptian forces massed for attack on the Suez Canal.

Israeli Defense Force (IDF) strategy relied on a small professional army, supported by a large and extremely competent air force, to hold back any Arab aggression while mobilization of a larger reserve-based army took place.²³ Once fully mobilized, the combined IDF would defeat the Arab aggressors. The IDF system depended heavily on its intelligence systems for early warning. The IDF was very confident in its abilities and in a corresponding lack of competence within the armed forces of its Arab foes.²⁴

The story the Egyptian deception plan wanted to portray was that its armed forces were not prepared to go to war anytime soon. The deception plan played on Israel's preconceived notions that they were vastly superior to Egyptian armed forces. The target for the deception was Israel's senior political and military decisionmakers.

A number of repetitious events were performed by the Egyptians in order to lull the Israeli government into a false sense of security. At the strategic level, President Sadat declared annually that "the year of decision" was at hand.²⁵ The Egyptian Army frequently practiced breeching and river crossing operations in plain view of the IDF.²⁶ As 6 October 1973 approached, the Egyptians brought successive brigades to the Suez Canal to train, then moved only a

battalion back to home station at night with their service-drive lights on.²⁷ The appearance to the IDF was that the entire brigade had departed. Finally, from the start of 1973 to October, the Egyptian Army conducted twenty separate mobilizations designed collectively to lull the IDF into passivity.²⁸

To reinforce Israel's perception of an incompetent Egyptian force, Sadat openly criticized the performance of Soviet military advisors and the equipment he was receiving. IDF forces regularly observed Egyptian soldiers fishing and walking along the banks of the Suez out of uniform.²⁹ The Soviets leaked false reports to the foreign press that the Egyptian missile force was negligent in their maintenance of Soviet supplied equipment.³⁰ Finally, the Egyptians kept tight security on the actual operation itself. Of 8000 captured Egyptian soldiers, only one was reported to have known of the operation prior to 3 October.³¹

The Egyptian deception plan for the Yom Kippur War did gain strategic and operational surprise that lead to early Arab successes. Israel was able to recover and gained back its lost territory. However, the Yom Kippur War is viewed as a strategic success for Sadat and Egypt. Sadat showed that Egyptian forces could compete with IDF forces and succeeded in lessening Israeli prestige.

Operational Deception in the Persian Gulf War

"Overall, the deception operation was key to achieving both tactical and operational surprise and,

ultimately, the ground offensive's success."³² So said the Department of Defense Report on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. A deception operation was required to facilitate the "Hail Mary"³³ maneuver of two US Army corps around the west end of the Iraqi front line and into the flank of the Republican Guards.

The deception played on the Iraqi military's preconceived notion that the US/coalition forces would attack directly into Kuwait. The Iraqis assumed that US forces could not maneuver in the vast, featureless desert west of Kuwait. Interestingly, there is no evidence that USCENTCOM tried to keep its GPS capability secret from the Iraqis to deceptively support their assumption. The deception objective was to keep the Iraqi forces oriented to the south and east and to prevent repositioning of Iraqi divisions further west along the Iraq-Saudi Arabian border.³⁴ The deception story portrayed a two-pronged attack into the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) attacking due north into Kuwait City and the VII and XVIII US Corps attacking into western Kuwait along the Wadi Al Batin. These attacks were to appear to be supported by an amphibious assault into eastern Kuwait by Marines afloat. The targets for the deception were Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi senior military leadership.³⁵

A majority of the operational deception events and actions remain classified, as do the actual operation orders for the Persian Gulf War. However, the major deception concepts have been released by various Department of Defense

agencies in the form of AARs and information pieces. USCENTCOM's operational deception plan relied heavily, if not entirely, on the four US services. Coalition forces do not appear to have knowingly played a significant role in the deception effort.

For the US air forces (USAF, Army, Navy, and Marines), the first priority for the deception effort was denying the Iraqi military knowledge of the date the allied air campaign would begin. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) accomplished this by conducting routine combat air patrols along the Saudi Arabian border adjacent to Iraq and occupied Kuwait.³⁶ The JFACC gradually increased the number of combat air patrols along the border in the weeks prior to the air campaign in order not to alarm the Iraqi air controllers when D-day arrived. There was no change to the intensity of the combat air patrols on 16 January; however, F-16s were substituted for F-15s in order to prepare the F-15s for the start of the air campaign on 17 January.³⁷

Another problem for the JFACC was the clearance of civilian aircraft from Saudi Arabian airspace. This was to be accomplished by announcing that a "special aircraft" (F-117) had crashed and that Saudi Arabian airspace was temporarily off limits while search and rescue was being conducted.³⁸ The special aircraft deception was not executed because the AWACS that was scheduled to announce the crash of the F-117 had maintenance problems and no other AWACS crew had been trained to take over the deception event.³⁹

US air forces aided in the deception effort by quickly establishing air supremacy in the KTO. This air supremacy denied the Iraqi military aerial reconnaissance of US and coalition forces and triggered the coalition forces' movement westward.⁴⁰ Iraq possessed MIG-21, MIG-25, and Mirage F-1EQ aircraft with imagery pods and side-looking airborne radar.⁴¹ Iraq flew reconnaissance flights along the Iraq-Kuwait border prior to 17 January 1991.⁴² US air forces also supported the numerous ground force artillery raids, feints, and demonstrations conducted primarily by the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st MEF prior to G-day. To support the story of a possible amphibious assault, air forces conducted air strikes aimed at destroying Iraqi naval forces.⁴³ Along with this effort, the JFACC also attacked Iraqi Silkworm missile sites positioned along the Iraqi and Kuwaiti coastline and attacked Iraqi units assigned the mission of coastal defense.⁴⁴ Marine helicopters conducted an amphibious demonstration off the Kuwaiti coast using electronic emitters to portray a large heliborne force.⁴⁵

The JFACC's greatest contribution to the deception story was in its shaping of the KTO battlefield during the preparation of the Iraqi ground forces in the air campaign. The JFACC divided the KTO into a grid system of "kill boxes." These kill boxes were 30x30 nautical mile-sized squares designed to become operating areas for attacking aircraft.⁴⁶ The kill boxes associated with the Wadi Al Batin avenue of approach and the kill boxes between the 1st MEF and Kuwait City received a vast majority of the air strikes (see Table

1). The US Air Force suggests that this weighting of certain kill boxes, "may have represented an effort at deception."⁴⁷ The VII Corps also credits the Air Force with contributing to the deception effort by targeting the 27th Iraqi Infantry Division.⁴⁸ The 27th Infantry Division was the Iraqi front line division deployed in the Wadi Al Batin. The US Air Force also mentions the relatively minor effort given to enemy units in western Iraq as also supporting the deception effort.⁴⁹ Examination of Table 1 and the overall kill box apportionment shows that the JFACC did expend a considerable percentage of air strikes in these two areas which would support the deception story that these were the areas where the main ground effort would take place.

TIME PERIOD	TOTAL AIRSTRIKES	WADI AL BATIN AREA	1ST MEF - KUWAIT CITY
WEEK 1	938	403 (43%)	212 (23%)
WEEK 2	2796	1945 (70%)	401 (14%)
WEEK 3	3512	1849 (53%)	1031 (29%)
WEEK 4	3972	1985 (50%)	1272 (32%)
WEEK 5	4048	1600 (40%)	1413 (35%)
TOTAL	20106	9201 (46%)	5229 (26%)

Table 1: Air Strikes in the KTO by Week.⁵⁰ Total Air Strikes in the KTO from 17 Jan - 28 Feb 1991⁵¹

Naval forces (US Navy and Marines afloat) played an instrumental role in the USCENTCOM deception operation. In the 27 February USCENTCOM briefing, General Schwarzkopf stated:

"We continued our heavy operations out in the sea because we wanted the Iraqis to continue to believe that we were going to conduct a massive amphibious operation in this area."⁵²

The deception story was that an amphibious landing would take place on the Kuwaiti coast. The objective was to keep Iraqi forces tied up with coastal defense duties.⁵³ These forces could have been used to strengthen Iraqi border units or continue the Iraqi defense further to the west. USCENTCOM planners briefed the use of amphibious operations to General Schwarzkopf on October 6, 1990.⁵⁴ An actual amphibious assault was ruled out early on due to its high risk in American lives.⁵⁵

The amphibious deception story was portrayed prior to the war by numerous amphibious training exercises -- Imminent Thunder and Sea Soldier. For most foreign nations, to include Iraq, the US Marine Corps represents an American elite fighting force -- a signature unit. There is good evidence that Iraq took seriously the threat of an amphibious assault. Iraq deployed an extensive three-belt minefield off the Kuwaiti coast. This minefield extended almost thirty miles into the Persian Gulf.⁵⁶ Iraq also established numerous Silkworm missile sites along the Kuwaiti coastline and on Faylaka Island.⁵⁷

Marine Corps leadership applied considerable pressure on Schwarzkopf to conduct an actual amphibious landing instead of the planned feints. There are also suggestions that USCENTCOM did not have a firm grasp on how the Marines afloat should be used,⁵⁸ and that the timing of the feints was poorly orchestrated.⁵⁹ The amphibious deception is clearly acknowledged by the Department of Defense, the subordinate Services, and other independent sources. The result of the amphibious deception was the commitment of four Iraqi divisions to coastline defense and the expenditure of considerable Iraqi resources.⁶⁰

The ground deception was performed by the Marines ashore (1st MEF) in the eastern portion of Saudi Arabia and the US Army (VII and XVIII US Corps) along the Wadi Al Batin. The deception story the ground forces portrayed was that a two pronged frontal assault was to be used to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Early in the air campaign, the 1st Cavalry Division(-) was committed in the Wadi Al Batin at the intersection of the Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabian borders. Along with the 1st MEF, the 1st Cavalry conducted a series of artillery raids, "berm busters", feints, and demonstrations designed to show US interest in these two avenues of approach.⁶¹ US leaders believed that US troop presence would indicate the location of the coalition's main effort to the Iraqi military.

VII Corps positioned itself just south of the southwest corner of Kuwait behind the Egyptian Corps and the 1st Cavalry.⁶² Any intelligence gathered on VII Corps was

consistent with preparation for an attack up the Wadi Al Batin and not further west as intended by USCENTCOM's actual plan. Besides the active physical presence of US forces in and around the Wadi Al Batin, US forces conducted psychological operations (PSYOPS) to support the deception effort. During "Berm Busters" conducted by the 1st Cavalry Division, US Army PSYOPS teams set up dummy tanks and Bradleys and played recorded mechanized noises throughout the night to illicit an Iraqi response.⁶³ Psychological operations also included dropping "surrender" leaflets on Iraqi positions marked with VII and XVIII Corps' identifications.⁶⁴ These leaflets supported the deception that US Army forces would attack directly into Kuwait.

US forces did not reposition further west until the air campaign stripped Iraq of its ability to conduct aerial reconnaissance.⁶⁵ Positioning of US logistic bases also supported the deception plan. Log Bases C and E, the logistics bases established in western Saudi Arabia to support XVIII and VII Corps, were not created until the air campaign started.⁶⁶ The timing of the log base establishment was delayed to support the deception effort.⁶⁷

Although considerable effort was made by VII Corps to support USCENTCOM's deception plan, XVIII Corps' support of the plan appears questionable at best. General Luck, fearing a flank attack from Iraq's 54th Division located in far western Iraq, designed a deception plan of his own to freeze the 54th Division in place. The XVIII Corps' deception portrayed an American armor brigade moving west into the town

of Ar'ar.⁶⁸ The XVIII Corps' deception plan was at cross-purposes with the overall USCENTCOM deception operation.⁶⁹ Also, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), attached to XVIII Corps, used the berm between Saudi Arabia and Iraq for target practice.⁷⁰ This action was a clear violation of operations security (OPSEC) for USCENTCOM and also ran cross-purpose to the overall deception effort. Finally, air transport in support of XVIII Corps' movement west was flown near the Iraqi border and could have been viewed by Iraqi forces.

There is no evidence that XVIII Corps' actions gave away the deception plan. Friction must be expected in military operations and deception operations are no exception. Examples of friction during the deception operations occurred with the land, naval, and air forces. Overall, the deception effort appears to have been successful. Iraqi defenders remained oriented to the south and east. The efforts of the ground forces seen to have kept a preponderance of Iraqi forces in eastern Kuwait (south of Kuwait City) and the Wadi Al Batin (from Saudi Arabia to Basra).⁷¹

In the Wadi Al Batin, the Iraqis positioned the 27th Division along a narrow ten kilometer front with its brigades lined up one behind another.⁷² The 27th Division, along with the 25th and 31st Division, were estimated to be the best dug in units, "due to their estimate that the Wadi Al Batin will be a primary avenue of approach for coalition ground forces."⁷³ Armor brigades from the 52d Armored Division were

attached to the front line infantry divisions in the Wadi AL Batin.⁷⁴ Also, the equivalent of two Iraqi artillery brigades moved up into the Wadi Al Batin area.⁷⁵ To continue the Wadi Al Batin deception after the ground campaign began, 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division conducted a demonstration from 23-24 February.⁷⁶ The success of this demonstration is seen in VII Corps' reports of the 1st UK Armoured Division attacking into the flanks of the 31st and 25th Iraqi Divisions as they remained oriented on the 1st Cavalry Division to their south.⁷⁷

Service Doctrine for Operational Deception

Service doctrine on military deception preceded development of Joint doctrine. The Army has by far the most doctrinal material written on military deception. A majority of the Army's doctrinal views on military deception are found in Field Manual 100-5 Operations, Field Manual 100-7 The Army in Theater Operations, and Field Manual 90-2 Battlefield Deception. FM 100-5, the Army's keystone doctrinal manual,⁷⁸ associates deception with the principle of war -- surprise. Specifically, that manual states that deception can increase the probability of achieving surprise.⁷⁹ In Chapter Six, Planning and Executing Operations, FM 100-5 states, "the deception objective is the enemy commander and the decisions he is expected to make during the operation."⁸⁰ This statement is somewhat different than other Army and Joint deception doctrine which emphasizes as a deception objective the desired action or lack of action by the enemy with the

deception target being the decisionmaker (commander) who has the authority to take the desired action or inaction.

Army manual FM 100-7 focuses on the operational level of war. FM 100-7 lists operational deception as a sub-element of operational protection within the six Operational Operating Systems (OOS).⁸¹ The manual recognizes operational deception as a major force multiplier for the operational commander.⁸² FM 100-7 states that while OPSEC and operational deception are sub-elements of operational protection; they are mutually supporting activities.⁸³ Deception is showing the enemy a false image to induce incorrect beliefs about friendly intentions, while OPSEC hides true friendly images from the enemy to prevent disclosure of actual friendly intent.

FM 100-7 views operational deception as, "an intellectual contest between opposing commanders."⁸⁴ This view of deception as a contest of wits can explain the pride taken by General Schwarzkopf in Operation Desert Storm press conferences when describing his fooling of the enemy. This phenomena of taking pride in outsmarting the enemy through deception is not new. Historically, commanders of successful deceptions seem to take great pride in outwitting the enemy. Napoleon, evidently proud of his achievements during the 1805 Danube Campaign, wrote:

"The enemy advanced into the passes of the Black Forest where he planned to position himself and hold up our penetration. ...our patrols which are scouring the countryside assure me that he has abandoned his plans, and that he appears to be gravely worried by our moves which are as unexpected as they are novel."⁸⁵

When planning operational deception, FM 100-7 states that the deception story should be a course of action not selected for execution during the deliberate decisionmaking process. There should be a level of congruence between the actual operation and the deception operation.⁸⁶ This congruence allows for activities performed in support of the actual operation to be viewed by the enemy as supporting the deception. The operational commander must ensure that coordination of strategic, operational, and tactical deception plans is effected so that they do not work at "cross-purposes."⁸⁷ XVIII Corps' tactical deception going cross-purpose with USCENTCOM's operational deception is an example of poor coordination between operational and tactical deception efforts. To facilitate coordination, and also to ensure the parallel planning of both the actual and deception operations, FM 100-7 recommends that the operational commander create a deception planning cell with representatives from all major staff sections.⁸⁸

The concept of making the deception story one of the courses of action that is not selected has additional merits besides built-in congruence. US doctrine requires that proposed courses of action to be feasible, acceptable, and suitable (FAS test) before being considered adequate for planning purposes. If the deception story already passes the FAS test as a course of action, then it is likely to be viewed as such, and believed, by the enemy. A unique concept presented by FM 100-7 is that the planning staff must be

prepared to execute the deception story as the actual operation.⁸⁹

FM 90-2 looks at deception at the operational and tactical levels of war.⁹⁰ It is both a theoretical and practical look at battlefield deception. On the theoretical side, the manual looks at revitalizing the "lost art" of deception.⁹¹ The manual presents popular myths about deception along with a lengthy presentation on deception maxims.

On the practical side, battlefield deception is tied in with three cornerstones: intelligence support, operations security, and integration/synchronization.⁹² FM 90-2 provides the components of deception -- objective, target, story, plan, and event. It also gives detailed guidance on the five-step deception planning process which is integrated into the deliberate decisionmaking process.⁹³ The manual outlines the enemy's deception means (ways of acquiring deceptive events) -- sonic, olfactory, visual, and electronic. Unique to FM 90-2 is the statement that deception should be used selectively and that it is unwise to use deception with every operation.⁹⁴

The Army's doctrine on military deception is unique when compared to the other three services in that the Army recognizes that military deception is performed at all three levels of war. Both FM 100-17 and FM 90-2 stress the linkage of deception operations performed at all three levels. FM 90-2 demonstrates the linkage and shows the benefits of integrated operations in figures 1 and 2.




Figure 1: Relationship Between Strategic and Operational Deceptions.⁹⁵




Figure 2: Relationship Between Operational and Tactical Deceptions.⁹⁶

The US Marine Corps is second to the Army in volume of military deception doctrine. Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 15-6, Strategic and Operational Deception, Fleet

Marine Force Manual 3-1, Command and Staff Action, Operational Handbook 6-1, Ground Combat Operations, and Operational Handbook 7-13, Military Deception, all contain significant material on deception.

FMERP 15-6 is not a doctrinal publication for the Marine Corps.⁹⁷ FMERP 15-6 provides the Marine Corps ideas about the history, theory, and principles of deception that can be used when planning for and conducting military deception. FMERP 15-6 is a unique publication. It is a thesis written by a Marine Corps fellow attending Ohio State University. As such, it represents one person's views on military deception.

FMERP 15-6 first looks into the history of deception, from Sun Tzu to the 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon. The publication also examines what various theorists had to say about deception (Sun Tzu, Vegetus, B.H. Liddell Hart, Michael Handel, Barton Whaley). After analyzing US doctrine on military deception, the author asserts that US doctrine (especially within the Marine Corps and Navy) is oriented at the tactical level of war and almost non-existent at the operational and strategic levels.⁹⁸ FMERP 15-6 asserts that military deception should be planned at all three levels of war and that operational deception should tie strategic and tactical deceptions together, with all three working towards a common objective. FMERP 15-6 asserts that this relationship between the three levels of deception must be written into military doctrine and practiced in the field. Published in December 1989, FMERP 15-6 predates the Army's

1993 FM 100-5 and FM 100-17, but not FM 90-2 and the other Marine Corps' manuals concerning military deception.

Of the Marine Corps' three doctrinal manuals addressing military deception, only OH 7-13 addresses deception at a level above tactical. Both FMFM 3-1 and OH 6-1 are focused on tactical level deception.⁹⁹ The Marines look at deception in much the same manner as the Army but view deception primarily as a tactical tool to facilitate high-risk missions inherent to the Marine Corps, i.e. amphibious operations, forced entry, NEO.

The Marine Corps uses the deception components of objective, target, story, plan, and event the same way as the Army. FMFM 3-1 recommends that a deception planning staff be formed¹⁰⁰ and that a deception annex be written to support the operations plan. The Marine Corps, like the Army, links deception with surprise and protection,¹⁰¹ and recognizes that deception is not an end in itself but supports the overall operation. The Marines also tie OPSEC and deception together as mutually supporting activities.

OH 7-13 recognizes that military deception exists at three levels -- tactical, strategic, and departmental/service.¹⁰² The Marine's departmental/service military deception definition is:

"Military deception planned and executed by military services about military systems, doctrine, tactics, techniques, personnel or service operations, or other activities to result in foreign actions which increase or maintain the originator's capabilities relative to adversaries."¹⁰³

The Marine's departmental/service military deception is a capabilities oriented concept. In other words, make an enemy believe you are capable of things you are actually not, or incapable of things that you actually are, so that at the time of mission execution you surprise him with your capabilities. Departmental/service military deception is by no means a lash up of the strategic and tactical levels of military deception. As such, departmental/service deception does not translate into operational deception. The Marine Corps also does not link strategic with tactical military deception like the Army does in FM 90-2 (see figures 1 and 2).

Even though Marine Corps and Army deception planning methods differ, OH 7-13 does share a concept with the Army on the timing of deception. The Marine Corps' and Army's doctrines advocate reverse planning procedures to place the enemy in a position of maximum disadvantage (see figure 3).




Figure 3: Reverse Planning to the Enemy's Maximum Disadvantage.¹⁰⁴

There are advantages to using this reverse planning procedure. First and foremost, this process makes the deception planner coordinate with the actual operation's planners on the desired enemy action and identifies the moment of maximum disadvantage for the enemy in relation to intended friendly actions. This aids in the synchronization of the deception plan with the actual operation plan. The reverse planning process also forces the deception planner to analyze the enemy's decisionmaking process, realizing that it might differ from US procedures significantly. The process makes the planner consider the enemy's intelligence system and how the enemy will collect and process the deceptive information. Finally, the reverse planning process allows the planner to determine how much planning time is available

or if it is even feasible (time wise) to perform the deception.

Marine Corps deception doctrine is very similar to that of the Army's. Personnel within the two services would have no problem communicating deception doctrine and practices. The major difference between the two services is that the Marine Corps doctrine looks at deception at the tactical level; has no written doctrine on operational deception; and does not link strategic deception with tactical deception.

When compared with the other three services, the US Navy has a limited amount of written doctrine. The Navy's primary manual for deception is Naval Warfare Publication 10-1-41, Navy Operational Deception and Counterdeception (U). NWP 10-1-41 is a classified document which also contains the Navy's unclassified views on military deception.

The Navy has a limited view of military deception. First, deception is used to protect the fleet from detection. Naval tactical deception is performed to support operations security.¹⁰⁵ That is to deceive the enemy fleet as to the whereabouts, composition, and intention of the friendly fleet. This limited focus is understandable, considering the decisiveness of naval warfare and the advantage rendered by achievement of surprise. The Navy recognizes that tactical deception is critical to achieving surprise and that surprise is an essential element of decisive victory.

NWP 10-1-41's title, "Operational Deception and Counterdeception", is somewhat misleading. The Navy thinks

about deception at the tactical level. NWP 10-1-41 states that tactical military deception is operational deception (OPDEC).¹⁰⁶ The Navy does recognize the term deception objective but says it is, "not defined; but varies based on conditions."¹⁰⁷ The other components of military deception (story, plan, events, target) are not formally recognized in the Navy's deception doctrine. In common with the Army and Marines, the Navy recognizes the three deceptive means -- physical, technical, and administrative.

Two points the Navy does emphasize in NWP 10-1-41 are deception training and counterdeception. NWP 10-1-41 emphasizes that deception must be integrated into training if units are to become proficient in it. Also, the Navy is the only service that devotes doctrine to counterdeception. Recognizing that no one nation's military has a monopoly on the use of deception, the Navy places special emphasis on recognizing and countering enemy deception efforts. Much of the Navy's counterdeception doctrine is classified, but the fact that they have any at all places them way ahead of their sister services.

By far, the US Air Force has the least amount of written doctrine on military deception. This lack of written doctrine makes the decision to make the Air Force the Lead Agent for Joint doctrine an interesting one. The Air Force's doctrinal manuals that contain significant material on deception are Air Force Regulation 28-3, War Planning: USAF Operation Planning Process, Air Force Manual 2-8, Aerospace

Operational Doctrine: Electronic Combat (EC) Operations, and Air Force Manual 1-9 Doctrine for Electromagnetic Combat.

Both AFM 2-8 and AFM 1-9 are concerned with combating enemy tactical deception in the form of false radio transmissions and signals. The Air Force, with its air controllers controlling air operations, is focused on preventing enemy forces from sending false transmissions to pilots and disrupting air missions. Like the Navy, the Air Force, by its very nature, is involved in a decisive business. If an enemy can achieve surprise through deception, the one time effect can be decisive. Both AFM 2-8 and AFM 1-9 are written at the tactical level. They do not address deception at the operational level, or even how the Air Force can support operational deception plans as formulated by a CINC or JTF Commander.

AF Reg 28-3 does address deception in the Air Force's planning process. AF Reg 28-3 ties in deception with PSYOPS and electronic warfare. The regulation recognizes the deception objective which is the same as the Army/Marine Corps' doctrines.¹⁰⁸ AF Reg 28-3 recognizes deception actions and tasks.¹⁰⁹ Air Force doctrine does not adequately address a deception story, plan, or target.

One deception concept that the Air Force recognizes in AF Reg 28-3 is the value of performing risk value assessment on any deception course of action.¹¹⁰ Basically, AF Reg 28-3 views any deception as a risk. Deceptions can fail for a number of reasons, to include the enemy discovering the deception operation, an enemy unable to

discover or understand the deception story, or an enemy unable to act, even though he believes the deception story. AF Reg 28-3 states that, before deciding on a deception course of action, a risk value assessment should be performed. The risk value assessment considers the amount of effort and resources that would be committed to the deception, the risk of the deception being compromised, and the probability of the deception actually achieving its objective. The assessment compares these criteria and others with the actual benefits that would be received if the deception succeeds. AF Reg 28-3 states that if the costs outweigh the benefits, then the deception should not be performed.

Another unique concept addressed by AF Reg 28-3 is deception termination authority. The regulation states that criteria should be established during the planning of the deception as to when and how the deception will be terminated. Deception operations should be terminated based on objective accomplishment or the compromise of the deception operation. In the case of the deception accomplishing its objective, termination criteria allow the force to end the deception in a timely manner without further expenditure of resources that could be used in actual operations.

Of the four Services, the Army is the only one to look at deception in any great detail at the operational level. The Army is also the only service to show linkage between strategic, operational, and tactical deception

operations. The Air Force's and Navy's deception doctrines are narrowly service oriented, which reflects the decisiveness of naval and air force engagements and the value of surprise to both of these services. The Marine Corps' doctrine closely parallels the Army's, but only emphasizes tactical deception and contains little material about operational and strategic deception.

Joint Doctrine for Operational Deception

The preponderance of Joint doctrine for military deception is found in Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. Joint Pub 3-58 is both a composite of the Services' earlier doctrine and some new ideas about military deception. Joint Pub 3-58 is concerned primarily with operational deception. This focus on the operational level matches Joint doctrine's audience of CINCs, JTF Commanders, JFACC, JFLCC, etc. who operate primarily at the operational level of war.

Like the Services, Joint doctrine links deception with the principle of war of surprise.¹¹¹ Joint doctrine also adds that deception facilitates the principles of mass, security, and economy of force.¹¹² Joint Pub 3-58 recognizes the elements of deception (objective, target, story, plan, and events) the same way as the Army and Marine Corps.

Joint Pub 3-58 recognizes six principles of military deception -- **focus, objective, centralized control, security, timeliness, and integration.**¹¹³ The **focus** of the deception is the target, the agent that can actually order the **objective**

to occur (action or inaction). **Centralized control** implies that deception operations are planned and controlled by one agency. JCS PUB 3-58 states that the deception operation may be executed in a decentralized manner as long as all participating organizations adhere to a single plan.¹¹⁴

Strict **security** or protection of knowledge of the intent to deceive is essential. Compromise of the deception can be devastating to the actual operation. Although Joint doctrine does not recommend the reverse planning process, **timeliness** is defined as the allowance of sufficient time for the deception to be read, accepted, and have the target act. **Integration** is the principle that deception operations must be fully integrated with the actual operation it is supporting. That is, deception is not an end in itself but a means of supporting the actual operation.

Like the Army, Joint Pub 3-58 lists deception planning steps and links them with the JOPES deliberate planning and crisis action planning processes.¹¹⁵ This combining of deception planning steps, and the actual operation planning cycle, ensures that the deception planning process is integrated into the operation from the beginning. This integration is also important from the standpoint of resource allocation. Deception operations compete with actual operations for resources. If the two are integrated, then resource problems can be harmonized and some resources can be used to support both the deception and the actual operation simultaneously.

Joint Pub 3-58 address the termination concept in greater detail than does AF Reg 28-3. Like the Air Force, Joint doctrine states that a termination concept must be addressed in the deception plan to provide for ending a successful deception or a deception that has been compromised.¹¹⁶ In terminating the deception, the actual fact that deception was performed should usually be kept secret to protect sensitive deception means (agents) and to keep the possibility of future deceptions open.¹¹⁷ The doctrine does state that the deception act might be made public if the goal is to denigrate the effectiveness of the deception target or the adversary leadership.¹¹⁸

Other deception concepts in Joint Pub 3-58 that can be found in the Services' doctrine are listed in Table 2.

Common Joint/Service Doctrine for Military Deception

<u>Joint Doctrine Concept</u>	<u>Found in:</u>
Risk Analysis	Air Force doctrine
Deception Security	All Services' doctrines
Deception Event Schedule	Army, Marine, Air Force doctrines
Security Criteria	All Services' doctrines
Three Levels of Deception	Army doctrine
Knowledge of Enemy's Decisionmaking Process	Army, Marine doctrines
Deception Not applying to Every Operation	Army/Air Force doctrines

Table 2: Common Joint/Service doctrine for military deception.

Joint doctrine for military deception is not just a synthesis of the Services' doctrine. The six principles of military deception are not found in the Services' doctrine. Another important and unique concept is that of Command and Control Warfare (C2W). C2W is:

The integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOPS), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction mutually supported by intelligence to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions."¹¹⁹

The relationship between OPSEC, PSYOPS, and deception have been mentioned previously. Electronic warfare and physical destruction of the enemy's command and control, along with his information sensors, must support both OPSEC and military deception. Joint Pub 3-58 emphasizes that friendly forces must limit the enemy's ability to detect friendly events we don't want him to see (supporting OPSEC) while allowing the enemy to detect events we do want him to see in support of the deception story. This balance must be achieved if we are to deny the enemy knowledge of our intentions while causing him to perform the actions detrimental to his cause.

Other topics addressed in Joint Pub 3-58 are potential effects of deception on coalition partners, deception feedback, and deception story criteria. Joint doctrine reminds planners that deception actions may unintentionally fool third parties like coalition partners. When conducting coalition warfare, planners must weigh the security risks of including coalition partners in the deception plan against the risk of having coalition partners adversely affected by the deception and disrupting actual operations.

Friendly intelligence sources must work hard at providing deception planners feedback on how the execution of the deception plan is preceding. This information should be in the form of operational and analytical data. Operational feedback addresses deception information reaching the target while analytical feedback is the actions the target is taking because of the deceptive information.¹²⁰ Based on feedback results, planners can decide whether to proceed with the deception plan as is; initiate branches or sequels to the deception plan; or terminate the plan if the enemy is not reacting as desired.

When planning a deception story, Joint doctrine states that the story must be **believable** (we would do it), **verifiable** (he could detect we are doing it), **consistent** (with our doctrine, capabilities, and past history), and **executable** (we are presently able to do it).¹²¹ These criteria are much like the Army's FAS test. They give the planner a means to analyze the deception story before wasting time and resources on it. If the deception story does not meet the four criteria, then it will not be perceived as believable by the enemy and will probably fail.

Finally, Joint doctrine places a limitation on military deception, stating "it will not intentionally target the US public, US Congress, or the US news media."¹²² This fact has been a point of contention between the US news media and the Department of Defense since the Persian Gulf War.

Analysis

Would the deception operations performed by USCENTCOM during the Persian Gulf War be compatible with subsequent Joint doctrine for military deception?

USCENTCOM's operational deception did adhere partially to the six principles of military deception listed in Joint Pub 3-58. The deception plan had a **focus** on the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, and the senior Iraqi military command.¹²³ These persons were the appropriate targets because they could affect the positioning and orientation of the Iraqi forces. USCENTCOM's **objective** apparently did cause the adversary to take desired action and inaction. At least, the Iraqi military did not make substantial reinforcements west of the Wadi Al Batin area. Iraqi forces continued to orient to the south and east even after the "Hail Mary" movement began. The Iraqi Army reinforced both the Wadi Al Batin and eastern Kuwait as the deception planners wished.

The principle of **centralized control** was generally adhered to. The overall deception plan was created by USCENTCOM. Corps Tactical Deception Elements met frequently with higher headquarters and subordinate division headquarters.¹²⁴ XVIII Corps' own tactical deception, and 3d ACR's OPSEC violations, were at cross-purposes with the overall deception plan and show a weakness in centralized control. The same events display a weakness in the **security** of the deception. However, examples such as the positioning of VII Corps, restriction on build up of Log Bases C and E, along with the restrictions on movements prior to the air

campaign, show that USCENTCOM was security conscious. The final measurement of security is the enemy's inability to detect the deception until it is too late. Numerous reports of Iraqi forces being misoriented and flanked by USCENTCOM forces demonstrate the effectiveness of the deception effort.

Timeliness of the deception operation appeared to be extremely satisfactory. The Iraqi's had positioned their forces in an operationally disadvantageous manner early in the operation. The question was whether the deception effort could keep the forces positioned they way they were. Independent reports, General Schwarzkopf's statements, and unclassified governmental reports indicate that the deception was planned far in advance and **integrated** with USCENTCOM's actual operation.

By Joint doctrine, C2W is an integrated operation. Unclassified evidence supports the conclusion that USCENTCOM conducted C2W effectively in supporting the operational deception. OPSEC operations were conducted in conjunction with deception. The positioning of VII Corps prior to the air campaign was a deception effort. USCENTCOM denied information on the movement of VII Corps during the air campaign to the enemy by OPSEC measures, EW, and physical destruction. PSYOPS also supported the deception in the form of decoy support for the numerous "berm busters" in and around the Wadi Al Batin and also by the deployment of surrender leaflets from the VII and XVIII Corps. These leaflets were dropped in areas that supported the deception effort.

Did electronic warfare and physical destruction support the deception story? This question cannot be answered completely until classified sources become available. However, the Iraqi military was probably receiving a good picture of what US forces were doing up until 17 January 1991. The Iraqi assessment of the situation probably was that the US was focusing its effort in eastern Saudi Arabia, along the Wadi Al Batin, and also preparing for an amphibious invasion. Orientation of Iraqi forces imply that they were being fooled by the deception.

The physical destruction of Iraq's ability to monitor the US situation was significant during the beginning of the air campaign. Iraq would get few reports on the enemy situation from their own sources. Concurrent with this lack of information on actions in the west, USCENTCOM sent highly visible misinformation in the form of artillery raids, feints, and demonstrations in the Wadi Al Batin and eastern Saudi Arabia. This combined with news reports largely limited to coastal sectors would have kept the Iraqi military focused on the picture they had before the air campaign started. By USCENTCOM's perspective, the Iraqi military was positioned favorably for the "Hail Mary" maneuver prior to 1 January 1991. Due to this positioning error by the Iraqis, the denial of information caused by EW and physical destruction was proper. In different circumstances, the destruction of Iraqi command and control and intelligence sensors could disrupt the enemy's ability to detect deceptive events and adversely effect the deception operation.

The termination concept of the operational deception is also impossible to determine with unclassified sources but it is a fair assessment to say that it ended on or about 27 February 1991. This is when General Schwarzkopf had his Central Command Briefing and told of the deception operations that had been used to fool the Iraqi leadership. Although Joint doctrine states that deception operations should normally be kept secret from the enemy after termination, Joint Pub 3-58 does allow for deception efforts to be made public for the purpose of embarrassing the target of the deception or enemy national leadership. It appears from the timing of the announcement of the deception, that USCENTCOM was using it as a tool to further throw the Iraqi senior leadership off balance.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In conclusion, the USCENTCOM deception plan is in concordance with subsequent US Joint doctrine. Although USCENTCOM's actions were not perfect in execution, the problems encountered in deception operations are similar to those encountered in other combat operations. Friction, or fog of war, affects deception operations, and deception planners must be prepared by having a plan flexible and robust enough to survive unforeseen occurrences.

The Persian Gulf War deception was similar to others studied in this monograph in the operational objective of the deception. The objective of the deception was to get the enemy to position and orient his forces in a disadvantageous

manner. A secondary objective was to keep the time of the actual attack (air and ground) secret. In researching operational level deceptions, enemy positioning tends to be the most common deception objective. The reason is the difficulty, at the operational level, to recover from an error in positioning. The seriousness of such an error was recognized by von Moltke (the Elder) who said mistakes in deployment might not be corrected until the campaign was over.¹²⁵ When planning for operational deception, planners should consider positional advantage as a primary deception objective.

US Joint and Service doctrine addresses deception without going into much detail on how to perform counter-deception. Planners must remember that deception is not a "silver bullet" possessed only by the US. Any nation, no matter how sophisticated their armed forces, can perform deception operations. The Yom Kippur War is a good example of a nation (Israel) underestimating the cleverness of their opponent (Egypt). Counterdeception needs to receive more attention in US doctrine. Planners and commanders who are engaged in deception operations must remember that the enemy may also be using deception.

Earlier, the monograph addressed the use of US Marines in the Persian Gulf War deception and how the Marines represented a signature unit for the US. The idea of using signature units to enhance a deception is not addressed in US doctrine. Planners should consider the use of signature units for deception operations if they are available. The

advantage of using these types of units is that they draw attention both from the enemy's intelligence sources and from the news media. Of course, use of signature units would have to fit into the actual operations plan and pass Joint doctrine's criteria of believable, verifiable, consistent, and executable.

Army doctrine states that the deception plan should be an executable option for the commander and that deception should not be performed during every operation. Joint doctrine does not address these two issues. Deception plans should, if possible, be executable branches to the main plan. An example of the benefit of this concept is if the Iraqis did not take seriously the amphibious threat during the Persian Gulf War and failed to reinforce their left flank. Then the execution of an actual amphibious assault as a branch to the plan would have been an option for the commander to consider.

The argument of not performing deception in some operations, because the enemy will start to expect and look for it, is a weak one. Good deception operations exploit enemy preconceived notions and should be performed whenever possible. Based on reverse planning to the enemy's maximum disadvantage (see figure 3) and deception cost/benefit analysis, time and resources may limit a unit's ability to perform deception but performance of military deception always should be considered.

Finally, the publication of Joint Pub 3-58 makes Joint doctrine for military deception the most recent for the

US. Service deception doctrine lags behind it by five to twenty-five years. Joint doctrine takes precedence, but Service doctrine much now catch up with the changes (some Services more than others). It is important for Service doctrine to be in agreement with the Joint doctrine from the perspective of common language and DTTPs (doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures). Young leaders will primarily use their own Service's doctrine until placed in a position to consider Joint doctrine. If the Services' doctrine is brought up to date with the Joint doctrine then commonality in the deception planning process will be easier to achieve.

Endnotes

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8. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966): p 384-385.
9. Ibid., p 394.
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11. Michael Dewar, The Art of Deception in Warfare, (Frome, Great Britain: David and Charles Publishers, 1989): p 39.
12. Ibid., p 40.
13. Operation Bertrum was the name of the British deception plan to support the El Alamein offensive in October 1942. The British main attack was to be along the Mediterranean coast with a supporting attack in the south. Operation Bertrum was an elaborate deception effort to convince the Germans that the main attack would be in the south and induce the Germans to position forces based on that belief. An intricate series of deceptions took place to

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